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Abstract 
States often experience disagreements such as competing territorial claims and sometimes they 
attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written settlements. Can these 
agreements help ensure a durable peace? I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to 
address differences after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well as 
agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of violence. I refer 
to these two sets of agreements together as ‘conciliatory agreements’. Using the theoretical 
framework of the bargaining model of war, I argue that the provisions specified in conciliatory 
agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust against the potentially disruptive 
effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in relative capabilities or regime type. 
Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements not only increase the likelihood that peace is 
maintained but also impact the kind of peace maintained. Specifically, competing states that 
experience disruptive changes may remain at peace either because they continue to accept the 
status quo or because they peacefully renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying 
agreement provisions can account for why, when conditions change, some states resort to force, 
while others peacefully renegotiate. I test my propositions concerning the effect of shocks and 
agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the likelihood of renegotiation using cases of 
territorial claims between 1919-1995, as identified by Huth and Allee (2002). I have collected 
conciliatory agreements for three regions (Middle East, the Americas and Europe) and present 
preliminary findings based on these regions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In their international relations, states often experience disagreements with one another 
such as competing territorial claims, disputes over resources, or differences over policy choice. 
Sometimes states attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written 
settlements. Can these agreements help ensure a durable peace between states with competing 
claims?  
Empirically, attempts to address disagreements peacefully are abundant. Indeed, states 
aim at peaceful settlements far more often than they resort to force. Huth and Allee’s (2002) 
work on 348 territorial claims between 1919 and 1995 shows that in 68 percent of the cases, 
major concessions happened without prior violence. Similarly, Hensel’s (2001) analysis of 74 
dyadic territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere between 1816 and 1992 reveals that bilateral 
negotiations, which take place in 91.9 percent of all cases, constitute the most common type of 
settlement attempt, while militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) make up less than one-fifth of all 
settlement attempts. 
Given that policy-makers have clearly recognized the potential of peaceful settlement 
attempts, it seems appropriate that scholars devote their energies to the systematic study of such 
attempts, and more specifically to the design of conflict resolution or conflict management 
agreements. By examining the circumstances under which these agreements are successful at 
ensuring a long-lasting peace and which provisions tend to be particularly promising, scholars 
can give pertinent advice to policy-makers. Unlike factors such as contiguity and relative power, 
the design of agreements is amenable to manipulation by decision-makers, and scholarly findings 
on the ‘optimal design’ of conflict settlement agreements can be directly translated into helpful 
policy-making advice.  
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Furthermore, studying the design of conflict resolution and conflict management 
agreements can contribute significantly to the theoretical debate about the prospects for 
cooperation. When states have fundamental disagreements and have fought over these 
disagreements or have found themselves at the brink of war, cooperation should be particularly 
difficult to achieve. Showing that even under these circumstances cooperation does occur and 
often is successful lends support to the institutionalist argument about the importance of 
international institutions. Not only can studies of cooperation among adversaries show that 
agreements matter but they can also take the next step and show how they matter: which kinds of 
provisions are successful and under which conditions they are successful.  
In this project, I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to address differences 
between pairs of states after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well 
as written agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of 
violence. I refer to these two sets of agreements together as ‘conciliatory agreements’— written 
agreements signed by official representatives of both states that help manage or resolve existing 
competing claims between the signatories. 
Using the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, I develop an argument 
to explain under which conditions states with competing claims are able to maintain a durable 
peace and what role conciliatory agreements play in achieving this desirable outcome. I argue 
that the provisions specified in conciliatory agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium 
more robust against the potentially disruptive effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in 
relative capabilities, regime type, or alliances. Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements 
not only increase the likelihood that peace is maintained but also impact the kind of peace 
maintained. Specifically, competing states that experience disruptive changes may remain at 
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peace either because they continue to accept the status quo or because they peacefully 
renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying agreement provisions can account for why, 
when conditions change, some states resort to force, while others peacefully renegotiate, and still 
others maintain their original agreement. 
In order to evaluate my propositions, I use an existing list of territorial claims between 
1919 and 1995, provided by Huth and Allee’s (2002) research. For each of these cases, I collect 
all conciliatory agreements between the claimants and use these to test my theoretical 
expectations about the impact of agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the 
occurrence of renegotiation. Currently I have finished collecting data for three regions: Middle 
East, the Americas, and Europe. I present preliminary findings based on these three regions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: the first section introduces the debate between Suzanne 
Werner (1999b, 2005) and Page Fortna (2003, 2004) concerning the effect of environmental 
changes and agreement provisions on the durability of peace. I show how the project proposed 
here synthesizes the two seemingly conflicting arguments, answers an important question that 
remains open in Werner’s work, and extends the empirical scope of Werner’s and Fortna’s 
studies. The second section presents the theoretical argument and derives testable hypotheses 
concerning the effect of environmental shocks and conciliatory agreement provisions on the 
durability of peace and the occurrence of renegotiation. The third section contains the research 
design. I discuss the selection of cases, the coding of the independent and dependent variables, 
and the statistical method applied. The fourth section presents some preliminary findings. 
Finally, I conclude with a brief review of the central argument and preliminary findings of this 
project.  
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THE WERNER-FORTNA DEBATE: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES OR AGREEMENTS 
Unfortunately, at this point, scholarly work can neither provide solid advice to decision-
makers about whether and how to design conciliatory agreements, nor can we confirm or 
disconfirm the institutionalist argument about the effect of such arrangements. There still exists 
considerable disagreement with respect to the question of whether agreements between 
opponents lead to a more durable peace.  
On one side of the debate we find scholars that argue that carefully designed agreements 
intended to manage conflicts do indeed increase the chances for a lasting peace, both in interstate 
and civil conflict (Holsti 1991, Miall 1992, Hartzell 1999, Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, Hampson 
1996). With respect to interstate conflict, recent work by Fortna (2003, 2004) provides the most 
encompassing treatment of the effects of post-war agreements on the durability of peace between 
former belligerents. Fortna argues that not only are cease-fires formed under those circumstances 
where conflict seems most likely to re-erupt, but they also tend to be quite effective at ensuring 
this fragile peace.  
On the other side of the debate we find scholars who assert that agreements have little or 
no direct effect on whether former opponents are able to maintain a lasting peace. Maoz (1984) 
and Senese and Quackenbush (2004) argue that a central factor accounting for the recurrence of 
conflict between opponents is whether the previous military confrontation ended in an imposed 
or a negotiated settlement, with imposed settlements leading to more stable peace. This suggests 
that agreements and their specific design do not matter, but rather that the durability of peace is a 
function of the balance of military power at the end of the confrontation. In her 1999 article on 
the “Precarious Nature of Peace”, Werner finds further support for this notion: the existence of 
formal peace agreements appears to have no effect on the recurrence of conflict. Instead, she 
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argues that the best explanation for the recurrence of conflict is that changes in relative 
capabilities and regime type introduce new uncertainty into the relationship between the 
belligerents. Given these changes, at least one side might believe that it should receive a better 
deal than the existing one. Changes lead to an incentive to renegotiate, and if renegotiation fails, 
conflict may recur. External circumstances and changes in such circumstances, such as shifts in 
relative power and regime changes, explain the recurrence of conflict, while agreements 
designed to reduce the chance of recurrent conflict seem to have no effect (see also Goertz and 
Diehl 1995). 
In a more recent article that reacts to Fortna’s work, Werner and Yuen (2005) argue 
further that changes in relative capabilities should be particularly prone to result in conflict if the 
opponents’ beliefs about who should get how much from fighting did not converge at the end of 
war, either because a third party forced the states to stop fighting or because the pattern of battle 
victories was inconsistent. In their empirical analysis, Werner and Yuen find strong support for 
the impact of “informational” variables on the durability of peace: changes in relative 
capabilities, wars interrupted by third parties, and inconsistent battle patterns are significantly 
and negatively related to the durability of peace. While Werner and Yuen find that these 
variables add significantly to the explanatory power of the empirical model, the addition of a 
variable that measures agreement strength (as proposed by Fortna) improves the statistical fit 
only slightly. They conclude that changes in relative power explain the recurrence of conflict, 
while agreement design is much less significant. 
In this project, I attempt to synthesize the work by Fortna and Werner and Yuen, provide 
an answer to a question that remains open in Werner’s work, and extend the argument about 
changes and agreement provisions to a larger set of cases. In order to provide a more powerful 
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explanation for why conflict occurs between opponents I incorporate pieces from both 
arguments: following Werner, I argue that changes in the environment such as changes in 
relative capabilities may lead to hostilities; following Fortna, I argue that the existence of 
agreements is an important factor in preventing the outbreak of fighting, even when changes 
occur. In fact, it is exactly when changes occur that we should observe agreements to matter 
most.  
I also argue that that the existence of specific provisions in conciliatory agreements can 
explain why some states renegotiate. In her original work, Werner (1999) concludes that 
incentives to renegotiate, created through changes in relative capabilities, are the most 
convincing explanation for the recurrence of war between former enemies. However, she does 
not explain why sometimes states are able to renegotiate but fail other times. “While this 
argument explains well why a former belligerent may attempt to renegotiate a settlement, it does 
not explain fully why such attempts sometimes result in violence” (p.919). I argue that the 
answer lies, at least partially, in the design of conciliatory agreements.  
Finally, I extend the empirical scope of cases that are considered. While Fortna and 
Werner focus on post-war agreements (cease-fire and peace agreements respectively), I examine 
cases in which states have fought a war but also cases in which states have competing claims but 
these claims have not resulted in violence. The literature on war as part of the bargaining process 
(especially Filson and Werner 2002) reveals that the dynamics of bargaining at the end of war do 
not differ from the dynamics of bargaining at the beginning of a war. This suggests that the 
argument developed in this paper applies to cases in which conflict has occurred as well as to 
cases in which conflict might occur. Provisions that help maintain a durable peace after the end 
of a war should also help prevent fighting in the first place. 
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
The Bargaining Model of War 
This project conceptualizes the effect of both environmental changes, such as changes in 
relative capabilities, and the design of conciliatory agreements in terms of the bargaining model 
of war (Fearon 1995; Powell 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004; Morrow 1989; Morgan 1994; Slantchev 
2003; Wagner 2000, 2004; Werner 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004).  
The basic set-up of the bargaining model is as follows: two states, A and B are bargaining 
over the division of an issue. Each side prefers to obtain as much as possible: A prefers itself to 
get everything and B to get nothing and vice versa. If the two states end up fighting, A will 
obtain its preferred outcome with probability p and B will win with probability 1-p. If A and B 
go to war they will have to pay costs cA and cB respectively. This means that A’s expected utility 
for fighting is p-cA (i.e. its probability of winning and obtaining its ideal outcomes minus the 
costs of fighting) and B’s expected utility is p+cB. The area between p-cA and p+cB is called the 
bargaining range. Any point in this range is preferred by both parties to fighting.  
If the status quo (SQ) lies within the bargaining range both parties are considered 
satisfied. It is when the SQ falls out of the bargaining range, then there is a dissatisfied party.1 If 
SQ < p-cA then A is dissatisfied and if SQ > p+cB B is dissatisfied.   
Intuitively, whenever a state becomes dissatisfied and prefers fighting over maintaining 
the SQ, conflict becomes more likely. If a state is dissatisfied, it is more likely to make a 
revisionist demand. This demand may then be rejected by the other side which, in turn, may lead 
to conflict. It is important to note, however, that in order for conflict to occur it is not enough for 
a state to become dissatisfied. While the dissatisfied state will try to obtain a new, more 
                                                
1 Powell shows that it is at most one state that can be dissatisfied. This follows from the assumptions that states are 
risk neutral or risk averse, that they agree on the distribution of power (i.e. on p) and that fighting is costly (Powell 
1996, fn.26). However, if any of these assumptions is relaxed both states can be dissatisfied. 
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favorable settlement, conflict will be averted if the other side accepts its demand. In this case the 
division of the issue will be renegotiated and peace will continue on new terms. Only if the other 
side rejects the demand war will ensue. Under which conditions would the satisfied state reject 
the dissatisfied state’s demands leading to costly conflict?  
A central explanation of bargaining failure is uncertainty.2 If both states have complete 
information, i.e. both states know the probability of winning (p) and their respective costs (cA 
and cB), the dissatisfied state, A, will simply make the largest demand that B will accept and they 
will peacefully renegotiate.3 On the other hand, if A is unsure about B’s reservation point (i.e. it 
either does not know the value of p or of cB) it faces the dilemma of either making a demand that 
is too large and would be rejected by B and therefore lead to conflict, or a demand that is too 
small, which would be inefficient since it leaves B with a too favorable division of the issue. 
This implies that when there is complete information the states will always be able to renegotiate 
peacefully, while if there is uncertainty it is possible that A’s demand will be rejected and 
conflict ensues.4 
                                                
2 Another explanation for conflict invokes commitment problems (Fearon 1995, Powell 2004). This explanation 
asserts that states are unable to reach a settlement because neither side can trust the other to uphold a deal in the 
future. A scenario in which commitment problems play a role is one in which one state, which is temporarily weak, 
is becoming more powerful over time. The other state, i.e. the one that is temporarily stronger, has an incentive to 
fight the state that is experiencing rapid shifts in order to prevent it from becoming stronger. Fighting could be 
avoided if the state that is gaining power could buy off the temporarily strong state. However, sometimes resource 
constraints require the buy-off to stretch over a longer period of time. But during this phase the initially weak state is 
becoming increasingly strong and will likely renege on its promise. Because a temporarily weak state’s commitment 
to buy-off the temporarily strong state is not credible, the temporarily strong state will prefer to use force. It is 
important to understand that what leads to commitment problems are shocks in the distribution of power that require 
such large amount of concessions to buy off the other side that, given resource constraints, the temporarily weak 
state is unable to do so in one transaction. This suggests that the shifts in the distribution of power have to be very 
large and fast in order for a commitment problem to develop. It seems that such significant shifts may not be very 
frequent in the relations between states. Thus, while commitment problems may play a role in some cases of 
international wars, the informational approach seems more broadly applicable.  
3 It will demand p+cB because this is the point where B is indifferent between fighting and accepting the deal. Any 
demand that asks for a more favorable division for A will be rejected because B prefers fighting. Any smaller 
demand is inefficient for A— it can gain more without provoking violent resistance from B. 
4 If uncertainty can lead to costly conflict, why do rational state leaders not simply exchange information on their 
military capabilities and their resolve? Fearon (1995) argues that states suffer from an incentive to misrepresent: in 
an effort to get as good a deal as possible they will exaggerate their military capabilities and resolve. Only costly 
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Changes and the Bargaining model 
The preceding discussion suggests that conflict occurs when a dissatisfied state demands 
a greater share of the issue at stake and this demand is rejected by its opponent. Furthermore, 
rejection of the demand and bargaining failure are a consequence of uncertainty. Thus we can 
point to SQ dissatisfaction combined with uncertainty as the central factor in the occurrence of 
conflict. Anything that makes a state dissatisfied and introduces or exacerbates uncertainty 
increases the risk of violent clashes. I argue that changes in the relationship between states and in 
their domestic politics can do both. 
 States are willing to accept the SQ and remain in a peaceful equilibrium— that may or 
may not be supported by a formal conciliatory agreement— if no major changes occur. This is 
true in cases in which the states have fought a war and the peace agreement has provided a new 
SQ, as well as in cases in which the states have competing claims but have not made explicit 
demands to change the SQ. As long as no shocks occur that may transform the parameters 
underlying the peaceful equilibrium, neither state will become dissatisfied and no additional 
uncertainty will be introduced. Under these conditions conflict is unlikely. 
The question then is which kinds of changes lead one side to be dissatisfied with the SQ 
and which kinds of changes create or exacerbate uncertainty. With respect to the first part of the 
question we know that side A will be dissatisfied if SQ<p-cA and B will be dissatisfied if 
SQ>p+cB . This means that any change in the probability of winning (p) makes dissatisfaction 
more likely. If side A has an increased probability of winning, A might become more 
dissatisfied; if side B becomes more likely to win, B will potentially become dissatisfied and 
                                                                                                                                                       
signals such as troop mobilization can transmit reliable information. On the other hand, Sartori (2002) argues that 
even diplomacy, or cheap talk, can confer information given the states’ incentives to avoid developing a reputation 
for bluffing. However, as Fearon and Sartori argue, both costly signals and cheap talk might actually increase the 
chance of conflict. Thus, uncertainty is a powerful explanation for the occurrence of conflict: unmitigated 
uncertainty increases the chance of conflict but the means by which uncertainty can be reduced also carry risks.  
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make a demand for a bigger share of the issue under dispute. This implies that anything that 
changes the probability of winning can create SQ dissatisfaction. While any change in the 
probability of winning makes it more likely that one side becomes dissatisfied and makes a 
demand, only a change that decreases cA and cB (i.e. decreases the costs of fighting) will make a 
state dissatisfied.  
An important clarification is in order: it is not changes in the probability of winning per 
se that increase the likelihood that a state will become dissatisfied but changes relative to the SQ 
value of the probability of winning. The SQ distribution of the issue reflects particular values of 
p (and cA and cB) that characterized the opponent’s probability of winning and their resolve when 
the SQ was first established. As long as p and cA and cB do not change relative to their values 
when the SQ was created, the parties will remain satisfied. However, if changes occur that make 
one side more likely to win relative to its probability of winning when the SQ was first 
established or decreases its costs relative to its costs when the SQ was first established, that state 
may become dissatisfied with the SQ and make a demand for a more favorable division of the 
issue.5  
Shocks to the bargaining parameters p, cA and cB relative to the SQ values of these 
parameters tend to create an incentive to renegotiate. Sometimes shocks are intense enough to 
induce such dissatisfaction with the SQ that a state is willing to fight to get a better deal; other 
times smaller changes occur that may make a state try to renegotiate but that do not change the 
circumstances enough to make that state willing to fight.6 
                                                
5 This suggests that what matters is not the size of changes from one year to the next, which is what Werner (1999b, 
2005) and Fortna (2003, 2004) look at, but the size of the change relative to the SQ value of the parameter.    
6 Smaller shocks might fail to make a state dissatisfied- while it may be more likely to win or more resolved its 
utility for maintaining the SQ still exceeds its utility for fighting. Under these conditions the state can demand a 
better deal and renegotiation might take place (under incomplete information). However, conflict will not occur 
because A is not willing to back up its demand by fighting in the case that B refuses to accept the demand. 
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While changes that modify the probability of winning or decrease the costs of fighting 
relative to the SQ values of these parameters, can make it more likely that a state will become 
dissatisfied and make a new demand, this by itself does not necessarily lead to conflict. Only if 
the other side rejects the demand for renegotiation, conflict will occur. We have seen that this 
can only occur when states have incomplete information about their relative military strength and 
costs of fighting. Unfortunately, changes in p and cA and cB might not only lead to SQ 
dissatisfaction and an incentive to renegotiate, but also introduce or exacerbate uncertainty, 
making conflict more likely.  
It is reasonable to assume that there is always some degree of uncertainty exist in the 
relations between states. States usually are not perfectly aware of who will win a military 
confrontation and at which costs. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the occurrence of changes in 
the relationship between states, their domestic politics and the issue at stake. Whenever such a 
change occurs both parties might know that a change has occurred and they might even know the 
nature and extent of this change but this does not mean that they can calculate the exact impact 
of this change on the probability of winning or each side’s costs of conflict.  
By creating both SQ dissatisfaction and uncertainty, changes in the relationship between 
states or their domestic politics increase the chance of conflict. This leads to the following 
theoretical propositions: 
TP1: Any change in the probability of winning (p), relative to the probability of winning at the 
time the SQ was formed, increases the probability of both renegotiation and conflict. 
TP2: Any change that decreases a state’s costs of fighting (i.e. cA or cB), relative to its costs of 
fighting when the SQ was formed, increases the likelihood of both renegotiation and conflict. 
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Agreement Provisions and the Bargaining Model 
 While environmental changes increase the likelihood of conflict, decision-makers do not 
simply stand by and let these changes have their detrimental effect. Rational decision-makers, 
foreseeing that the future may bring many changes, try to prevent such changes from resulting in 
the outbreak of hostilities by designing agreements that increase the chance that shocks can be 
absorbed peacefully. 
 The existence of conciliatory agreements and their specific provisions increases the 
probability that, given the occurrence of changes, two opposing states will be able to manage 
their competing claims to the issue peacefully (either by maintaining the existing agreement or 
by peacefully renegotiating its terms) rather than resorting to the use of force. Conciliatory 
agreements help make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust to environmental shocks. 
Bringing together Fortna’s (2003, 2004) and Werner’s (1999b, 2005) seemingly conflicting 
arguments, I propose that conciliatory agreements matter most when changes take place and the 
risk of conflict is therefore heightened.7  
Two types of mechanisms are particularly useful at preventing changes from leading to 
conflict: cost-increasing provisions (e.g. troop withdrawal, demilitarized zones, issue linkage) 
and uncertainty-reducing provisions (e.g. exchange of military information, hot line, onsite or 
aerial verification). Cost-increasing provisions are designed to minimize the chance that a state 
will become dissatisfied with the SQ. If an agreement significantly increases the costs that a state 
has to bear if it decides to fight, then it might prefer not to fight even if it is now more likely to 
win a military confrontation or has an increased resolve: too high costs might make fighting and 
obtaining a revision of the SQ unattractive. 
                                                
7 Note that this has implications for my empirical tests. While Fortna and Werner examine the effect of changes and 
agreement provisions by adding these as separate variables to their statistical model, I propose that the proper way of 
testing the effect of agreements is by using an interaction term.  
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T3: Given the occurrence of changes in p or a decrease in cA or cB, conciliatory agreements with 
cost-increasing provisions reduce the likelihood of conflict between states experiencing 
competing claims. 
The second type of provision contained in conciliatory agreements addresses the second 
factor that tends to increase the likelihood of violent clashes. In order for conflict to occur, a state 
needs not only to be dissatisfied and make a demand but that demand also needs to be rejected by 
its opponent. According to the bargaining model, the main reason for why demands are rejected 
and bargaining breaks down is incomplete information. Since uncertainty is a key factor in the 
occurrence of conflict, rational decision-makers often attempt to design agreements that help 
reduce uncertainty by providing reliable information to both sides.  
TP4: Given the occurrence of changes in p or a decrease in cA or cB, conciliatory agreements 
with uncertainty-reducing provisions reduce the likelihood of conflict between states 
experiencing competing claims. 
While both of these types of provisions minimize the chance of conflict, they might have 
slightly different effects with respect to whether peace is maintained because the original 
agreement is upheld or a new agreement is negotiated in the face of changes.  
Cost-increasing provisions affect the size of the bargaining range. If, for example, cost-
decreasing shocks occur, such as one state’s transformation into an authoritarian regime, then 
cost-increasing provisions contained in the conciliatory agreement might weigh against these 
shocks. Cost-decreasing shocks will reduce the size of the bargaining range but the cost-
increasing provisions contained in the agreement will ensure that the bargaining range remains 
larger than it would be if no agreement had been concluded. A larger bargaining range, in turn, 
increases the chance that the original agreement remains in the bargaining range. Similarly, if a 
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shock occurs that increases a state’s chance of winning a military confrontation, the bargaining 
range will be shifted toward that state’s ideal point. Agreement provisions that increase costs, 
however, can increase the size of the bargaining range so that even if the bargaining range shifts, 
the original division stays in the bargaining range. By making it more likely that the SQ remains 
within the bargaining range, cost-increasing provisions help maintain the SQ. Peace will 
continue on old terms. 
TP5: Given the occurrence of changes in p or a decrease in cA or cB, cost-increasing provisions 
increase the likelihood that the SQ will be maintained and peace persists on old terms. 
While cost-increasing provisions raise the likelihood that the SQ is maintained despite 
changes, uncertainty-reducing provisions increase the likelihood of renegotiation. Shocks to the 
bargaining parameters can change the location and size of the bargaining range and therefore 
lead to SQ dissatisfaction. If the SQ is not a viable option anymore, then a new deal needs to be 
located that is acceptable to both. Uncertainty-reducing provisions help the two opposing states 
locate a bargain that is acceptable to both sides given that changes have occurred. Thus, when 
there are uncertainty-reducing provisions, renegotiation is more likely to occur. Peace will 
continue on new terms. 
TP6: Given the occurrence of changes in p or a decrease in cA or cB, uncertainty-reducing 
provisions increase the likelihood of renegotiation, with peace continuing on new terms. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Case Selection 
In order to examine my propositions concerning the effects of changes and conciliatory 
agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the occurrence of renegotiation, I use Huth 
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and Allee’s (2002) data on world-wide territorial claims cases between 1919 and 1995.8 While 
the theoretical argument applies to any type of claim, the empirical part of this project focuses on 
territorial claims. The extant literature on territory and conflict reveals a widespread consensus 
that territorial issues are particularly conflict-prone (Gochman and Leng 1983, Holsti 1991, 
Vasquez 1993, Hensel 1996, and Senese 1996, Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, Huth 2000). The 
fact that territorial disputes are more likely to lead to violent conflict than other claims implies 
that this project examines particularly hard cases for international cooperation.  
Before Huth and Allee’s data can be used to evaluate the theoretical propositions, a 
number of important changes need to be carried out. In Huth and Allee’s data, the same pair of 
states can be involved in multiple cases of territorial claims. There are three reasons for this. 
First, if both states are challengers this is captured by two separate cases in Huth and Allee’s 
data. Second, if there is a claim and the two states agree on a settlement, Huth and Allee code the 
claim as terminating. If the claim resurfaces it is counted as a different claim case. Third, states 
might have multiple territorial claims concerning different pieces of territory. 
I aggregate all claims between the same pair of states into one claim. First, since I am not 
interested in the question of who challenges, I eliminate the duplicate cases. Second, I consider 
both the initial challenge and the resurfacing of the claim part of the same case. I am interested in 
examining whether the agreements that states conclude are successful at averting conflict. A 
resurfacing of the claim helps determine whether the initial claim was successfully managed or 
not. Third, I combine all cases of territorial claims between the same pair of states into one case. 
Rather than conceptualizing a number of bargaining processes concerning different pieces of 
                                                
8 Huth and Allee define territorial claims as “disagreements between governments over (a) the location of existing 
international boundaries in particular sectors or along the length of their common border, (b) the refusal of one 
government to recognize another’s claim of sovereign rights over islands, claiming sovereignty for itself instead, or 
(c) the refusal of one government to recognize another state as a political-territorial unit, laying claim to the territory 
of that state” (p.300). 
 17 
territory, the bargaining process is conceptualized as applying to the entirety of the territory that 
can be divided between the claimants. When states find themselves in a SQ this is a ‘general’ 
SQ. Keeping the claims separate implies that there can be a SQ for one claim and not one for 
another, which seems inappropriate given the theoretical argument.9  
In some of Huth and Allee’s claims there are multiple states on one or both sides. Most of 
these cases involve colonial powers (e.g. Saudi Arabia-Britain/Kuwait). Such cases are split up 
into two separate claims: first the claim between the colonial power (i.e. Britain) and its 
adversary (i.e. Saudi Arabia) which is censored when the colony (i.e. Kuwait) becomes 
independent, and second the claim between the former colony and the original adversary that 
begins after the colony gains independence.10  
The final change is the result of needing to define empirically what the SQ point is. This 
is crucial for two reasons. First, I need to determine the starting point for my observations. 
Second, I need to identify the point relative to which changes are measured. I determine as the 
SQ point the division of the issue that results from the first interaction of the competing states 
after the claim starts. Say the claim starts in 1951 and in 1953, after either talks or a militarized 
dispute, the two states arrive at an agreement on the division of the issue. This agreement is the 
new SQ (which can be the same as the SQ in the beginning of the claim if the states simply 
reaffirmed the division already existing in 1951).11 Thus I code 1953 as the SQ point. 
                                                
9 Furthermore, if changes occur and one side becomes dissatisfied there is no reason to expect that it will demand 
more of territory A. It might as well demand more of territory B or claim a new piece of territory, in which case my 
change hypotheses might not find any support. However, this is not the case because changes do not lead states to 
potentially become dissatisfied and demand more but because changes do not necessarily lead states to demand 
more of all the territories disputed by them. 
10 I also eliminate two cases that involve countries that were not independent according to the Correlates of War date 
(Correlates of War project, 2005). These cases are Hijaz-Najd and North Yemen-Asir.  
11 I examined for all of Huth and Allee’s cases the duration of time that passes between the beginning of the 
competing claim and the first talk or MID. If many years pass between the beginning of the competing claim and the 
occurrence of talks or a MID then it may be inappropriate to determine the result of the first talk or MID as the SQ. I 
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This operationalization of the SQ leads to the exclusion of a few claims in which either 
the states never engaged in talks or a militarized dispute or in which talks and disputes occurred 
every year after Huth and Allee’s beginning of the claim.12  
After these changes to Huth and Allee’s data I obtain 125 territorial claims in the three 
regions for which all agreements have been collected: 42 claims in the Middle East, 41 in the 
Americas, and 42 in Europe. Using these claims, I then create a data set in which every 
observation is a territorial-claim-SQ-year. For each territorial claim, I determine the (first) SQ 
that the two competing states reach and include as an observation every year following this 
initial year until either conflict or renegotiation occurs or if neither takes place, the observation is 
coded as right-censored in 1995.  
Consider for example the following case(s): a territorial claim starts in 1951, in 1953 the 
two states make concessions after talks, and in 1975 they fight. For this case, I include 1953 and 
every year following 1953 until 1975. There are 22 rows in the data for this territorial claim. In 
1975, after the conflict, a new case starts and if there is no militarized conflict or renegotiation 
until the cut-off point in 1995 this case is coded as right-censored.13 This means that one 
territorial claim may yield one or more cases: whenever the states engage in a militarized conflict 
or renegotiate the divisions of the issue a new case starts. Based on this operationalization, I 
obtain 245 cases (85 in the Middle East, 85 in the Americas, and 75 in Europe).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
found that in more than 85 percent of the cases a talk or MID occurs within five years of the start of the competing 
claim. 
12 This occurred is 22 cases. 
13 The new case usually starts right after the MID. So if there is a MID until e.g. September 5, 1975, the new case 
starts on September 6, 1975. The exception are cases in which states lost their independence for a few years after the 
MID (e.g. World War II Europe). These cases start as soon as both states regain independence.  
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Independent Variables 
 Three sets of independent variables are included in my analysis: change variables, 
agreement provision variables, and interactions between the two.  The theoretical section argues 
that any change in the probability of winning relative to the SQ value of p increases the 
likelihood of both renegotiation and conflict. Similarly a decrease in cA and/or cB, i.e. a decrease 
in the costs of fighting, increases the likelihood of both renegotiation and conflict. Empirically, 
what kinds of events constitute shocks to p and cA and/or cB? 
The following changes constitute shocks to p: changes in relative power and internal 
violence. Relative power is a function of both military and economic strength. Military strength 
directly affects a state’s ability to prevail in a military confrontation, while economic strength 
has an indirect effect on a state’s chance of winning a military confrontation. An economically 
powerful state has latent resources that can be mobilized during a military confrontation, making 
the state ultimately more likely to win. Thus, any change in economic or military strength 
relative to the SQ may constitute a shock to p.  
Relative power is operationalized using the COW composite index of national capability 
score (CINC score) that includes information on the demographic, industrial and military power 
of each state (Singer 1987). In building my measure of changes in relative capabilities, I rely on 
the measure of percentage change in the opponents’ relative capabilities suggested by Werner 
(1999).14  
Note that Werner’s measure needs to be further adjusted according to my theoretical 
argument. While Werner expects changes in relative capabilities from one year to the next to 
increase the likelihood of conflict, I expect that changes in relative capabilities compared to the 
                                                
14 The formula that corresponds to this measure is  |(Pi,t / Pj,t )- (Pi,t-1 / Pj,t-1 )| / (Pi,t-1 / Pj,t-1). See Werner 1999, p.923, 
fn.7. 
 20 
SQ distribution of capabilities increase the likelihood of conflict. For this reason I measure 
changes in relative power as the percentage change in the belligerent’s relative power compared 
to the SQ and adjust Werner’s formula in the following way: |(Pi,t / Pj,t )- (Pi,sq / Pj,sq )| / (Pi,sq / 
Pj,sq).  
The second type of event that can affect a state’s performance in a military confrontation 
are internal disasters such as civil wars. States that experience civil wars need to direct their 
resources towards a domestic adversary and may be less capable of prevailing against an external 
enemy. For example, the 1971-war between India and Pakistan can be seen as a direct result of 
the revolt and secessions of East Pakistan. Pakistan’s domestic chaos created a strategic 
opportunity for India to make territorial gains (Werner and Yuen 2005). 
Information regarding the occurrence of civil wars is available from the Correlates of 
War (COW) project (Sarkees 2000). Based on the COW intra-state conflict data version 3.0, I 
create a variable that compares the domestic situation in any given year to the domestic situation 
in place when the SQ was first established. If no civil war was ongoing when the SQ was formed 
then the occurrence of a civil war may weaken the state that is experiencing the domestic conflict 
and increase the other state’s probability of winning. If the reverse is true and a civil war was 
ongoing when the SQ was formed, then the end of the civil war strengthens the state that was 
experiencing the civil war. Given that now its resources need not be diverted towards the 
domestic conflict that state will be more likely to win a military confrontation with its opponent 
than it was when the SQ was introduced, potentially making it dissatisfied with the SQ.  
In order to capture these dynamics, I create a variable that is coded 1 in a given year if 
either of the states is experiencing a civil war but did not experience a civil war when the SQ was 
introduced or when a state is not anymore experiencing a civil war but did when the SQ was first 
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introduced. Conversely, this variable is coded 0 if neither state experiences a civil war and did 
not experience one when the SQ was formed or if one of the states is experiencing a civil war 
and also experienced a civil war when the SQ was established.15   
Since both changes in relative capabilities from the SQ and the occurrence or termination 
of civil wars are hypothesized to affect the probability of winning a military conflict, i.e. p, I 
combine these two variables into a single measure of changes in the probability of winning. This 
new measure is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if either there have been changes in relative 
capabilities of 30 percent or more since the status quo was established or if the civil war variable 
is coded 1 in a given year.16 
With respect to the costs of fighting, the international relations literature has identified 
regime type as an important factor. In democracies, leaders experience higher costs for fighting 
wars, which makes them less likely to prefer fighting to accepting the SQ. On the other hand, 
authoritarian leaders experience fewer costs and are thus more likely to fight to obtain a more 
favorable division of the issue (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). 
Thus, if there is a regime change in a country after the SQ is established and the country turns 
autocratic, its costs of fighting are reduced making it more willing to go to war.  
In order to determine whether such a regime change occurs I use the democracy scores 
provided by the POLITY IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).17 Any year in which a state had a 
                                                
15 If both states experienced a civil war when the SQ was established but the civil war stops in both countries then 
those years during which the civil war stops in both countries and internal peace is ongoing are coded 0 – neither 
side should now be more likely to win. Similarly, if neither side had an ongoing civil war when the SQ was 
established and a civil war erupted in both countries then the years in which both countries experience the civil war 
are coded as 0.  
16 I examined other thresholds including changes of 10 percent, 50 percent, 60 percent and 100 percent. The changes 
in the probability winning variable is closest to statistical significance with the 30 percent threshold but becomes 
less significant at the 50 percent, 60 percent, and 100 percent threshold. Overall, the findings for this measure are 
not robust.  
17 Unfortunately, a significant number of observations have missing values for their Polity4 democracy score. This is 
particularly problematic if the SQ year is missing: every following year is missing as well. Due to missing Polity4 
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democracy score of 6 and higher is coded as a year in which the state was a democracy; any year 
in which the state had a score of 5 and lower is coded as a year in which the state was an 
autocracy. I then create a dummy variable that is coded 1 if either state started out the claim 
being a democracy but then experienced a regime change and turned autocratic.  
The second set of independent variables of interest are the agreement provision variables, 
i.e. cost-increasing and uncertainty-reducing provisions. In order to code these variables, I collect 
all conciliatory agreements between the claimants. Conciliatory agreements are defined as 
‘written agreements signed by official representatives of both states that help manage or resolve 
existing competing claims between the signatories’.18 
Using this definition, I compile a list of candidate agreements based on agreements 
mentioned in Huth and Allee’s (2002) and Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s (2006) case summaries, 
Biger’s (1995) description of boundaries, Day’s (1987) and Butterworth’s (1976) synopses of 
border and territorial disputes as well as the material provided by the International Boundary 
Studies project. I also search three main document sources for the time between 1919 and 1995 
(League of Nations Treaty Series, United Nations Treaty Series, and British Foreign and State 
Papers) for all relevant agreements. I have been able to obtain a significant portion of the 
agreements on the candidate list using only these document collections. For those agreements 
that are missing I turn to secondary sources that discuss the relations between the claimants 
                                                                                                                                                       
data, 48 cases would drop out. In order to minimize this problem I fill in information on whether a state is a 
democracy or not in the SQ year of the claim using three techniques. First, using Polity4d, I identify cases in which 
the SQ was formed during a part of the year in which the democracy score is not missing and code these cases 
accordingly. Second, I use the Freedom House data to code cases that involve Belize or Surinam. Third, cases that 
were coded as missing due to foreign occupation (-66) or collapse of political authority (-77) are coded as autocracy 
years. Fourth, for the remaining cases, I identified whether a country is a democracy or not using historical sources. 
Since coding based on historical sources is subjective I also run the analysis with a data set in which I do not fill in 
the SQ years based on historical sources. The results are consistent.   
18 In order for an agreement to qualify as a conciliatory agreement it needs to mention differences between the 
claimants in either a specific or abstract fashion. This means that not only agreements that mention explicitly the 
issue at stake but also agreements that refer more generally to differences that the states seek to resolve are included 
in the data set.   
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and/or the claim in detail. While I have been able to locate and obtain a copy of most agreements 
(at least for Latin America, Europe, and Middle East), a few agreements unfortunately remain 
elusive.19       
For all conciliatory agreements, I code which cost-increasing and uncertainty-reducing 
provisions they contain. Cost-increasing provisions include troop withdrawal, demilitarized 
zones, third-party guarantees, peace-keeping, arbitration provisions, and provisions for border 
cooperation (e.g. hydroelectric plants). Troop withdrawal and demilitarized zones impose 
physical constraints on the two sides: the states have to move their troops back to the combat 
line. Third-party guarantees may also raise the physical costs of fighting: the aggressor will not 
only have to fight its opponent’s army but potentially also the forces of a guarantee power. 
Peacekeeping and arbitration create cost through a different mechanism. Peacekeepers can only 
be deployed with the consent of both sides and such consent signals the determination to foster 
peace. If suddenly one side attacks its opponent, the international reaction might be more severe 
than if no peacekeepers were deployed. Similarly, if states agree to submit a dispute to 
arbitration or potentially even have accepted the award but then go back on this, they may suffer 
reputation costs. The final cost-increasing provision is based on the notion of issue linkage: if 
states cooperate on a variety of issues conflict is more costly because they are risking losing their 
gains from this cooperation. 
 Uncertainty-reducing provisions comprise exchange of information on maneuvers, troop 
movements and troop strength, regular consultations between military leaders or the 
establishment of a “hotline”, surveillance by the claimants themselves, and monitoring by third 
parties. Exchange of information on maneuvers etc. and regular meetings rely on the states 
exchanging information about troop strength and resolve, while surveillance provisions allow 
                                                
19 There are about 44 agreements may contain relevant provisions that I have been unable to find so far. 
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each side to check up on the other and monitoring by observers allows third parties to check up 
on one or both claimants. Appendix 1 provides examples for what kinds of provisions are coded 
as cost-increasing or uncertainty-reducing.  
Based on these provision variables I code two summary measures, one for cost-increasing 
provisions and one for uncertainty-reducing provisions. The first measure is a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 if the states had at least one cost-increasing measure in place between them in a 
given year. The second dummy variable is coded 1 if the two states had at least one uncertainty-
reducing provision is place in a given year.20  
Finally, since a central argument of this paper is that it is given changes that agreement 
provisions should matter most, I create interaction terms between change and agreement 
provision variables. First I create a variable that identifies whether there has been any change 
during a given year. This variable is coded 1 if either the change in relative capabilities variable 
is coded 1, the civil war variable is coded 1, or the regime change variable is coded 1. I then 
multiply this variable with the dummy that indicates whether any cost-increasing provisions were 
in place and I also multiply it with the dummy that indicates whether any uncertainty-reducing 
provisions were in place. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the duration of time until either conflict occurrence or 
renegotiation. In order to code these variables I need information on both the occurrence of 
conflict and renegotiation between the two competing states.  
I code a conflict as occurring between a pair of states if they experience a military inter-
state dispute (MID) that involves the use of force (i.e. level 4 and higher) and in which the 
                                                
20 Of the 245 cases, 98 have neither cost-increasing nor uncertainty-reducing provisions in place, 45 cases have only 
cost-increasing provisions, 48 have only uncertainty-reducing, and 54 have both. I also create a count variable of the 
agreement provisions. The results are consistent. 
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motivation of at least one of the two states is territory. This means that both war and the use of 
force short of war are coded as failures of peace/the SQ. Both involve costs in terms of material 
and lives and thus fulfill the basic assumption of the bargaining model, that conflict is costly.  
  In order to identify cases of the use of force between claimants I use the dyadic MID 
version 2.0 (DYDMID2.0) compiled by Maoz (2005). Using the dyadic version of the data, I try 
to ensure that, in the case of a multilateral dispute, the two states did actually use force against 
each other and that territory was the issue at stake between them. There are a total of 103 MIDs 
in the data. Some dyads experience no MID at all, while others experience multiple MIDs.   
The second event of theoretical interest is the incidence of renegotiation between the 
opponents. Renegotiations can be understood as any peaceful and mutually recognized change in 
the territorial SQ between the claimants.21 In order to determine when such renegotiations occur 
I use Tir et al’s (1998) data on changes of the territorial SQ. Whenever a territorial change 
between the claimants occurs and if this change is peaceful and if conquest is not the procedure 
of transfer according to Tir et al. I code this as a renegotiation. There are a total of 28 peaceful 
renegotiations in the three regions included in the analysis here. 
 Observations can end in three ways: conflict, renegotiation, or censoring. So far I have 
discussed the two outcomes of theoretical interest. The third possibility, censoring, occurs for the 
following reasons. An observation is censored at the end of the observation period (i.e. 1995) if 
the claimants experience neither conflict nor renegotiation. Cases are coded as censored if they 
become obsolete because the two claimants unify (e.g. East and West Germany) or if one of the 
claimants disintegrates (e.g. Czechoslovakia). Cases are also coded as censored if the piece of 
                                                
21 Note that for renegotiation to occur the division of the issue under dispute must be modified. A change of conflict 
management is not considered renegotiation. 
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territory that is at the center of the claim becomes independent and does not continue to pursue 
the claim anymore (e.g. the claim between Brazil and Britain concerning Guyana). 
Statistical Method 
As discussed above, the dependent variable is the duration of the SQ until either conflict 
or renegotiation. Whenever a spell (here: SQ acceptance) may fail in more than one way and 
there is reason to believe that the covariates have a different effect on the likelihood of each 
outcome, competing risks analysis is an appropriate statistical technique (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004). I assume that at any time the SQ is at risk of being overturned by conflict or by 
renegotiation and that, conditional on the independent variables, the hazards of the risks are 
independent. This allows me to estimate separate duration models for renegotiation and for 
conflict, treating the termination due to the respectively other risk as censored. 
There are a variety of parametric and non-parametric duration models that differ 
depending on the assumption one makes about the hazard rate, i.e. instantaneous rate of failure at 
time t conditional on survival until time t. For this analysis, I use the Cox proportional hazards 
model.22 The advantage of the Cox model is that it avoids making restrictive assumptions about 
the hazard rate that may not be met and may result in misleading inferences concerning the effect 
of the covariates on duration time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Instead of positing a 
constant or monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rate, the Cox leaves the form of the 
baseline hazard rate unspecified.23  
                                                
22 Continuous time models, including the Cox model, generally assume that there are no ties (i.e. coterminous 
events). However, the Cox model, unlike parametric models, can be adapted to handle tied data (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 2004, p.53f.). I use the Efron method for most analysis. Since my data contains many ties, I also estimate 
the statistical models using the exact discrete method, which is preferable but also more computationally demanding. 
The results are consistent.    
23 While the Cox model does not make any restrictive assumptions about the shape of the hazard, it does assume that 
the effect of each covariate on the hazard is proportional over time. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) and Box-
Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn (2003) warn that a violation of the proportional hazard assumption may lead to 
biased estimates, incorrect standard errors, and misleading substantive interpretations. Because of the consequences 
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Interpretation of the basic Cox model is straightforward. Since coefficients are 
parameterized in terms of the hazard rate, a positive coefficient suggests that the hazard rate is 
increasing, i.e. that higher values of the covariate lead to an increased risk of experiencing the 
event of interest. Conversely, negative coefficients indicate that the hazard rate is decreasing, i.e. 
that higher values of the covariate reduce the risk of experiencing the event.  
Given the nature of the independent variables, in particular the change variables, I need to 
complicate the Cox model by including time-varying covariates (TVCs). Given data availability 
the TVCs are measured annually. Time-varying covariates can be interpreted as the change in the 
log-hazard ratio for observations that experience a unit change in the value of the TVC versus 
observations that experience no such change in the value of the TVC at time t. The estimated 
covariate parameter reveals by how much the risk of an event increases or decreases given the 
change in the value of the covariate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, p.104ff.). 
A further complication arises due to the nature of the data: there is likely to be some 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Unobserved heterogeneity occurs if, despite holding all 
independent variables constant, some observations are more failure-prone than others. The 
presence of heterogeneity can lead to inconsistent parameter estimates, wrong standard errors, as 
well as misleading estimates of duration dependence (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones point out that this is a typical complication in studies of 
militarized disputes where some dyads never experience conflict (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004, p.148). Thus, I expect that heterogeneity may be present in the analysis undertaken here. In 
fact, there are two additional reasons to suspect heterogeneity in the data analyzed here. First, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
from violation of the assumption, they strongly recommend that it be tested and, if evidence of a non-proportional 
effect of a covariate found, that this be corrected for in one’s model. I test for the possibility of nonproportionality 
using the Grambsch and Therneau global proportional hazards test statistics and Harrel’s rho, as suggested by Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, p.135). I find that once the heterogeneity of the observations is taken into account, 
non-proportionality is not anymore a problem.  
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data include cases of claimants that have experienced different hostility levels in the past. There 
are claimants that have fought full-blown interstate wars, cases that have had militarized disputes 
below the level of war, and cases in which the states have expressed their claims verbally but not 
used any violence against each other. 
Although the theoretical argument assumes that the same mechanism of conflict and 
renegotiation applies to all of these cases, there may be some variation in conflict proneness 
among them. Holding the type and magnitude of changes constant, the SQ may be more likely to 
be overthrown between states that have fought wars before than between states that have had 
relatively peaceful relations. The reason is that states that have fought a war over their borders 
previously probably value the disputed territory more than other states. In terms of the 
bargaining model, this implies that the bargaining range may be smaller (given lower cA and cB), 
which in turn means that if even a smaller change occurs one of the states can become 
dissatisfied and willing to fight.  
A second, but related, concern is the fact that some of the cases experience multiple 
militarized disputes. Of the 125 claim dyads included in this analysis, 20 experience more than 
one MID, while only four dyads renegotiate more than once and none renegotiate more than 
twice. Like cases that involve states that have previously fought wars, cases with multiple MIDs 
may be characterized by greater hostility levels and are therefore potentially more failure-prone, 
especially with respect to experiencing conflict. Repeated events may thus reflect heterogeneity 
in the data: some dyads are more failure prone than others and the repeated failures in these 
dyads are not independent of one another. Standard duration analysis will falsely treat the events 
as independent and therefore lead to an overestimation of the amount of information these 
repeated events provide: the standard errors will be smaller than they should be. Taking the 
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heterogeneity of different observations into account, helps address the problem of falsely 
deflated standard errors. 
In order to address the problem of heterogeneity I estimate a “frailty model”. The basic 
idea underlying the frailty model is to introduce into the hazard rate an additional random 
parameter that accounts for random frailties. These frailties may be individual-specific or group 
specific. The frailties here are group specific: all cases associated with a dyad that has previously 
fought a war or experienced multiple MIDs. Thus I estimate a Cox model with a frailty 
parameter shared at the dyadic level. The model assumes that frailties are distributed according 
to the Gamma distribution (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, p.142-148).24 Estimation of this 
model helps identify whether heterogeneity is indeed present and helps account for the effect of 
this heterogeneity on the parameter estimates and standard errors. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. While my theoretical argument clearly suggests that 
agreement provision variables should matter most when changes have occurred, and thus calls 
for the use of interaction terms, I first run an analysis in which agreement provision variables and 
changes are included separately. The reason for this is two-fold. First, one way to evaluate the 
claim that agreement provisions should matter most when changes occur and thus conflict is 
most likely, is to compare the fit of a model that includes the agreement provision variables next 
to change variables to a model that includes interaction terms of agreement and change variables. 
Second, while I attempt to capture a number of possible changes to the parameters underlying the 
                                                
24 It is possible to assume that frailties are distributed according to any continuous distribution with positive 
numbers, a unit mean and a finite variance. Other possibilities than the Gamma distribution that have been used are 
the inverse Gaussian and log-normal. However, the Gamma has been the most readily adopted (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 2004, p.144). 
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peaceful equilibrium, there are some changes that naturally occur but are not explicitly measured 
here. For example, diseases and natural disaster may occur that affect a state’s ability to win a 
military confrontation. Since shocks to the parameters underlying the bargaining model may take 
place that are not included in my empirical model, it makes sense to examine the impact of 
conciliatory agreement provisions on the duration of the SQ independent of measured changes.  
Given the expectation of heterogeneity among cases, the effect of changes in the 
probability of winning, decreases in the costs of fighting, cost-increasing and uncertainty-
reducing provisions on the hazard of a militarized dispute and renegotiation are examined in a 
Cox proportional hazards shared frailty model. 
Table 1 here 
Three sets of results are of interest: the findings concerning heterogeneity, the findings on 
the change variables, and the findings on the agreements provision variables. With respect to the 
first set of findings, the results show that the variance of the random effect for the occurrence of 
conflict is not zero and statistically significant. Thus, the shared frailty model confirms the 
expectation that some cases are more likely to experience conflict than others, even accounting 
for the independent variables. The Cox frailty model allows investigation of whether it is the 
case that previous warfare accounts for the heterogeneity in conflict proneness. I re-estimate the 
statistical model presented in Table 1 and obtain an estimate of each dyad’s frailty. I then check 
whether dyads that have previously fought wars over territory are more frail than others. Almost 
two thirds of the cases that had previously fought are prone to fail through another conflict but 
only about a third of those that did not fight a war previously are marked as more conflict prone.   
Table 2 here 
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Unlike for the hazard of conflict, there appears to be no heterogeneity with respect to the 
risk of experiencing renegotiation. The random effect is not statistically different from zero. This 
is not surprising since the key factor explaining heterogeneity in conflict-proneness appears to be 
previous warfare. Cases that have previously fought wars and therefore endure high levels of 
hostility should be more likely to fight again but not necessarily more likely to renegotiate. The 
findings concerning heterogeneity suggest that a shared frailty model is appropriate for the 
analysis of conflict occurrence between competing states but not necessary for the analysis of 
renegotiation. 
With respect to change variables, the findings are mixed. On first glance, the results for 
the incidence of militarized disputes indicate that changes in the probability of winning and 
decreases in the costs of fighting have their expected effect: they increase the hazard of conflict 
by 56% and 270% respectively. It is important to point out, however, that while the results for 
decreases in the costs of fighting are robust and strong, this is not true for changes in the 
probability of winning. The results for this variable are driven by its civil war component. Civil 
wars appear to consistently raise the risk of conflict, while changes in relative capabilities have 
no effect in analyses in which these two variables are included separately.25 Furthermore, it turns 
out that neither changes in the probability of winning nor decreases in the costs of fighting 
appear to have any effect on the occurrence of renegotiation between the two states.  
                                                
25 The latter result is surprising given Werner (1998) and Werner and Yuen’s (2005) finding that changes in relative 
capabilities are one of the strongest predictors of conflict recurrence. It is important to note that Werner’s measure 
differs from the one employed in this study. Werner looks at changes in relative capabilities from year to year, while 
I look at changes in relative capabilities from the SQ. One possible reason for why my variable does not receive any 
empirical support is that there is a positive correlation between duration time and changes: the more time passes by, 
the more the states’ relative capabilities will have changed from the SQ. Since a significant proportion of cases 
never experiences conflict, it appears as if large changes are associated with peace rather than conflict. However, it 
may still be the case that, in any given year, a larger change is more likely to lead to conflict than a smaller change. 
The latter is the effect the theory predicts but this effect may be confounded by the positive relationship between 
time and changes. Werner’s measure, on the other hand, is history-independent and therefore does not suffer from 
this problem. 
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More interesting are the findings concerning the effect of agreement provision. As 
expected, cost-increasing provisions significantly reduce the hazard of conflict (by 61%) and 
uncertainty-reducing provisions increase the hazard of renegotiation (by 181%). These findings 
are fully commensurate with the theoretical argument. Interestingly, however, uncertainty-
reducing provisions do not seem to reduce the hazard of fighting. While the variable has a 
negative sign, it is far from conventional levels of statistical significance. This finding is 
theoretically puzzling: the argument suggests that anything that makes renegotiation more likely 
should make conflict less likely but this is not supported by the empirical evidence concerning 
the effect of uncertainty-reducing provisions.  
One possible explanation for this finding lies in the realist endogeneity critique: those 
states that are least conflict-prone are the ones that are most likely to renegotiate and most likely 
to agree on uncertainty-reducing provisions. In other words, the fact that these states do not have 
very conflictual relations explains both the outcome, i.e. renegotiation, and the fact that 
uncertainty-reducing provisions are in place.  
 However, a closer look at the raw data reveals that it is not the case that only states that 
are less conflict-prone renegotiate. If conflict-proneness is operationalized in terms of previous 
wars, it turns out that one quarter of the cases (7 out of 28) that renegotiate peacefully are 
conflict prone but only one-fifth (20 out of 103) of the cases that fight another MID are conflict-
prone. It is true that a larger proportion of the cases that renegotiate have uncertainty-reducing 
provisions in place than cases that experience conflict (46 percent and compared to 23 percent). 
However, among the cases that renegotiate, it is the more conflict-prone cases that tend to have 
uncertainty-reducing provisions rather than the less conflict-prone cases: 71 percent (5 out of 7) 
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of the conflict prone cases that renegotiate have concluded agreements with uncertainty-reducing 
provisions, as compared to 38 percent (8 out of 21) of the less conflict-prone cases.  
Furthermore, what is striking is that conflict-prone claimants that renegotiate tend to have 
different uncertainty-reducing provisions in place than less conflict-prone cases. All conflict-
prone states that renegotiate consistently have provisions that call for military inspections either 
by the other side or by a third party and none of these cases become involved in another MID 
after they renegotiate. On the other hand, these provisions are quite rare among cases that end up 
fighting, both conflict-prone and less conflict-prone cases. Instead, cases that end up 
experiencing a MID tend to have uncertainty-reducing provisions that call for the exchange of 
information between the two sides. This suggests that provisions that call for inspections by the 
other side or third-party monitoring may be more successful at transmitting information and thus 
preventing conflict than voluntary exchanges of information.26 
 The second step of the empirical analysis is to test the argument that is given changes that 
agreement provisions should matter most. The appropriate way of testing this argument is by 
including interaction terms between agreement provisions and change variables in the statistical 
model.27 
Table 3 here 
Table 3 reveals three interesting findings. First, the interaction terms between changes 
and agreement provision variables are consistently not significant. Second, the change variable 
by itself is positive and statistically significant, indicating that when the provision variables are 
                                                
26 This finding supports Fearon’s (1995) argument that, because states face an incentive to misrepresent their 
military capabilities and resolve to get a better deal, information conveyed by diplomacy is not necessarily credible. 
On the other hand, if states can themselves inspect their opponent’s military bases or they can get information from 
a third party, this information overcomes the incentive to misrepresent problem and thus actually does help reduce 
uncertainty. 
27 Given the previous finding that the conflict model suffers from heterogeneity but the renegotiation model does 
not, I use a shared frailty model for the conflict analysis and a standard Cox model for the renegotiation analysis.  
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set to 0, changes in the probability of winning or decreases in the costs of fighting do raise the 
hazard of conflict. Third, it appears that if the change variable is set to 0, cost-increasing 
provisions do reduce the hazard of violent conflict between the claimants.  
Of these various results, the only result that conforms to the theoretical argument is the 
finding concerning the effect of changes. The theoretical argument would predict that when no 
cost-increasing or uncertainty-reducing provisions are in place, changes should indeed lead to 
conflict. Conversely, the theoretical argument proposes that when states do have conciliatory 
agreements with cost-increasing and/or uncertainty-reducing provisions, changes should be less 
likely to lead to conflict. In fact, it is when changes occur that we should see the effect of these 
provisions. Paradoxically, what the results reveal is that, when changes take place, agreement 
provisions do not seem to have any effect on either the hazard of conflict or renegotiation: the 
interaction terms are not significant.  Instead, cost-increasing provisions appear to affect the 
hazard of conflict (by 59%) when no changes occur.28  
One intuitive explanation for these findings lies in the rather weak operationalization of 
the concepts of changes in the probability of winning and decreases in the costs of fighting. 
Changes in the probability of winning are measured by changes in relative capabilities from the 
SQ and by the occurrence or termination of civil war. The first measure, i.e. changes in relative 
capabilities from the SQ, is flawed29 and the second measure gets only at very large shocks in the 
probability of winning. Civil wars are important events that significantly affect a state’s ability to 
direct resources against an outside enemy. Like civil wars, regime transitions also signify high 
intensity events with a potentially very large effect on the costs of fighting. Large shocks will 
                                                
28 The coefficient of uncertainty-reducing provisions is not statistically significant for the occurrence of 
renegotiation. Part of the reason may be the strain the interaction term model puts on the data: there are only very 
few instances of renegotiation (27!). 
29 See fn. 25. 
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lead to a significant shift in the location of the bargaining range (for changes in the probability of 
winning induced by the occurrence or termination of civil war) or contraction of the bargaining 
range (for decreases in the costs of fighting induced by regime transition). Under these 
conditions, even if cost-increasing provisions enlarge the range of acceptable outcomes relative 
to what the bargaining range would be without cost-increasing provisions, the changes are still 
likely to make one of the claimants dissatisfied and they also exacerbate uncertainty between the 
two sides. In other words, the changes are simply too large for cost-increasing provisions to have 
their effect.  
While cost-increasing and uncertainty-reducing provisions appear not to help when large 
changes occur, they may be successful for smaller or mid-level changes that have the potential to 
threaten peace. There are plenty of changes that occur between or within the states, such as 
swings in public opinion, leadership changes, changes in alliance patterns, and discovery of 
natural resources in the disputed area, that are not explicitly measured here but that may lead to 
conflict or renegotiation. This might help explain the finding that cost-increasing provisions 
reduce the hazard of conflict when the change variable is coded 0. The presence of cost-
increasing provisions does not help prevent conflict when large changes occur, but they do 
prevent that smaller changes, that are not explicitly included in the statistical model, lead to 
conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
  States that experience disagreements, such as competing territorial claims, often sign 
conciliatory agreements in order to help them manage their differences peacefully. Leaders 
anticipate that even if they have been able to agree on a particular SQ environmental shocks may 
occur that could lead to the breakdown of the peaceful equilibrium. Based on the logic of the 
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bargaining model of conflict, events that change the probability of winning (i.e. p) or that 
decrease the costs of fighting (i.e. decrease c) relative to the value of these parameters when the 
SQ was first formed are particularly dangerous.  
The bargaining model not only allows identification of which sorts of changes may lead 
to the breakdown of peace between states with competing claims but it also points to the kinds of 
provisions of conciliatory agreements that can help prevent such a breakdown. It suggests that 
two types of provisions should be particularly successful at ensuring a lasting peace between 
states: cost-increasing provisions and uncertainty-reducing provisions. While both of these 
provisions should reduce the likelihood of conflict between states with competing claims, the 
mechanisms by which they work are slightly different. Cost-increasing provisions should 
increase the chance that, in the face of changes, the states will maintain the SQ and uncertainty-
reducing provisions should increase the chance that, in the face of changes, the states will 
peacefully renegotiate.  
In order to evaluate the theoretical propositions about the effect of changes and 
agreement provisions I start with a list of world-wide territorial claims cases between 1919-1995, 
provided by Huth and Allee (2002). I collect and code all conciliatory agreements between the 
claim dyads. So far, I have been able to complete coding for three regions of the world (Middle 
East, the Americas, and Europe) and the preliminary findings I report in this paper are based on 
cases drawn from these three regions. 
At this point, the empirical support for the theoretical argument is mixed. With respect to 
the effect of different types of changes, I find that decreases in the costs of fighting, which are 
operationalized as transitions from democracy to autocracy, have the expected effect with respect 
to the occurrence of MIDs: they do indeed increase the hazard of fighting between the claimants. 
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The results for changes in the probability of winning, on the other hand, are weaker. As 
expected, I find that cases in which either of the states suddenly experiences a civil war or 
experienced a civil war when the SQ was formed but the civil war ends face an increased hazard 
of fighting. On the other hand, the second component of changes in the probability of winning, 
i.e. changes in the relative capabilities of the states, tends not to be significant in the analysis and 
produces inconsistent results. Furthermore, it also appears that the various kinds of changes are 
not very good at explaining renegotiation between states. 
The results for agreement provisions are also mixed. I find support for the notion that 
cost-increasing provisions reduce the hazard of conflict and that uncertainty-reducing provisions 
increase the hazard that the states will renegotiate peacefully. The latter finding is particularly 
strong if one takes into account the low number of renegotiations currently in the data (27!). 
However, contrary to the theoretical argument, uncertainty-reducing provisions do not reduce the 
hazard of conflict and neither cost-increasing provisions nor uncertainty-provisions seem to 
matter more when changes have occurred. Instead, the results indicate that it is when no changes 
take place that cost-increasing provisions decrease the hazard of conflict and uncertainty-
reducing provisions increase the hazard of renegotiation.  
While there are a number of explanations for the various unexpected findings, the fact 
that the empirical support is mixed and some very important theoretical propositions have not 
been born out by the evidence, also points to the possibility that the theoretical argument is false. 
Changes and agreement provisions may simply not work in the ways proposed in this paper.  
However, before the theoretical argument should be considered falsified, more empirical 
testing needs to be undertaken. One large problem underlying the entire data analysis is the 
relatively small number of cases, as well as militarized disputes and renegotiations. The data are 
 38 
particularly sparse with respect to renegotiations: there are only 27 incidents of peaceful 
renegotiation. The collection of conciliatory agreements for the two remaining regions, Asia and 
Africa, will increase the number of territorial claim cases, militarized disputes, and 
renegotiations and thus allow for more reliable results. Given data limitations, one can say that 
the jury is still out on whether changes and agreement provisions work the way it is proposed 
here. Further testing is required before the findings can be considered conclusive. 
 
 39 
Bibliography 
 
Biger, Gideon in collaboration with the International Boundaries Research Unit, University of 
Durham, England. 1995. The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries. New York: Facts on 
File.   
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet and Bradford Jones. 1997. “Time if of the Essence: Event History 
Modeling in Political Science.” American Journal of Political Science 41/4: 1414-1416. 
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet and Christopher Zorn. 2001. “Duration Models and Proportional 
Hazards in Political Science.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 951-967. 
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, Dan Reiter and Christopher Zorn. 2003. “Nonproportional Hazards 
and Event History Analysis in International Relations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47: 33-53. 
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet and Bradford Jones. 2004. Event History Modeling. A Guide for Social 
Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2004. “Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms.” 
International Organization 58: 807-820. 
 
Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. A Study of Crises. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Butterworth, Robert Lyle. With Margaret Scranton. 1976. Managing Interstate Conflict: 1945-
74: Data with Synopses. Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of 
Pittsburgh. 
 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. 
The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Day, Alan J. (ed.). 1987. Border and Territorial Disputes. A Keesing’s Reference Publication. 
2nd edition. Burnt Mill: Longman. 
 
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49/3: 
379-414. 
 
Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2002. “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating 
the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.” American Journal of Political Science 46/4: 819-
838. 
 
Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2004. “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime 
Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 48/2: 296-
313. 
 
 40 
Fortna, Page. 2003. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace.” International 
Organization 57: 337-372. 
 
Fortna, Page. 2004. Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. “The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: 
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-
154. 
Gochman, Charles and Russell Leng. 1983. “Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of 
Attributes and Behavior” International Studies Quarterly 27: 97-120.  
Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1992. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. New 
York: Routledge.  
 
Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1995. “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries.” 
American Journal of Political Science 39:30-52. 
 
Hampson, Fen Olser. 1996. Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail. 
Washington D.C.: Unites States Institute for Peace Press. 
 
Hartzell, Caroline A. 1999. “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate 
Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43/1: 3-22. 
 
Hensel, Paul. 1996. “Charting a Course to Conflict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 
15/1: 43-74. 
 
Hensel, Paul. 2001. “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial 
Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992.” International Studies Quarterly 45/1: 81-109. 
 
Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell. 2003. “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation 
of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.” Journal of Peace Research 40/3: 303-320. 
 
Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Huth, Paul K. 1998. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Huth, Paul K. 2000. “Territory: Why are Territorial Disputes Between States a Central Cause of 
International Conflict?” in What Do We Know About War, edited by John Vasquez. Boulder: 
Rowman&Littlefield, 85-110. 
 
Huth, Paul K. and Todd L. Allee. 2002. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 41 
 
Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer and J. David Singer. 1996 . “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 
1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, 15/2: 163:213. 
 
Klein, James, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. “The New Rivalry Data Set: Procedures and 
Patterns.” Journal of Peace Research 43/3: 331-348. 
 
League of Nations. various years. Treaty Series; Publications of Treaties and International 
Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League. 205 vols. London: Harrison and 
Sons, Ltd. 
 
Maoz, Zeev. 1984. “Peace by Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816-
1976.” Journal of Peace Research 21/3: 227-241. 
 
Maoz, Zeev  (2005). Dyadic MID Dataset (version 2.0): 
http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html. 
 
Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual. College 
Park: University of Maryland. 
 
Miall, Hugh. 1992. The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Morgan, T. Clifton and Sally Campbell. 1991. “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraint and 
War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 187-211. 
 
Morgan, T. Clifton. 1994. Untying the Knot of War: A Bargaining Theory of International 
Crises. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model 
of Crisis Bargaining." American Journal of Political Science 33: 941-972. 
 
Powell, Robert. 1996. “Stability and the Distribution of Power.” World Politics 48:239-267. 
 
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Powell, Robert. 2002. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 5: 1-30. 
 
Powell, Robert. 2004a. “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete 
Information.” American Political Science Review 98/2: 231-242. 
 
Powell, Robert. 2004b.“Bargaining and Learning while Fighting.” American Journal of Political 
Science 48/2: 344-361. 
 42 
 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid. 2000. “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997.” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 18/1: 123-144. 
 
Sartori, Anne. 2002. “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in 
International Disputes.” International Organization 56/1: 121- 149. 
 
Senese, Paul. 1996. “Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience.” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 15/2: 133-161. 
 
Senese, Paul D. and Stephen L. Quackenbush. 2003. “Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect 
of Dispute Settlements on the Durations of Peace.” Journal of Politics 65/3: 696-717. 
 
Singer, J. David. 1987. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities 
of States, 1816-1985.” International Interactions 14/2: 115-132. 
 
Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.” American 
Political Science Review 97/4: 621-632. 
 
Tir, Jaroslav, Philipp Schafer, Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz. 1998. “Territorial Changes, 1816-
1996: Procedures and Data.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 16/1: 89-97. 
 
United Nations. various years. UN Treaty Series. New York: United Nations. 
 
Vasquez, John. 1993. The War Puzzle. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. “Bargaining and War.” American Journal of Political Science 44/3: 
469-484. 
 
Walter, Barbara. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International 
Organization 51: 335-364. 
 
Werner, Suzanne. 1999a. “Choosing Demands Strategically: The Benefits of Power, The 
Distribution of Benefits, and the Risk of Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43/6: 705-726. 
 
Werner, Suzanne. 1999b. “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the 
Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms.” American Journal of Politics 43/3: 912-934. 
 
Werner, Suzanne. 2000. “Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party 
Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science 44/4: 720-732. 
 
Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen. 2005. “Making and Keeping Peace.” International 
Organization 59/2: 262-293. 
 
 
 
 43 
APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Examples of Cost-increasing and Uncertainty-reducing provisions 
 
A. Examples of Cost-increasing provisions: 
 
-  Troop withdrawal: “withdrawing the forces of the two countries from the positions they 
currently occupy” (Chad-Libya 1989) 
 
- Demilitarized zone: “they mutually undertake not to construct any fortified building within a 
distance of 5 kilom. On either side of the frontier ” (Saudi Arabia-North Yemen 1934) 
 
- Guarantors: “the High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee (…) the 
maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and 
Belgium and Germany and France” (Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy 1925) 
 
-Peacekeepers: “in this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Force” (Israel-Syria 1974) 
 
- Arbitration/adjudication: “submit the dispute to an impartial tribunal” (UK-Saudi Arabia 1954) 
 
- Issue linkage: “construct an oil pipeline” (Argentina-Bolivia 1941) 
 
 
 
B. Examples of Uncertainty-reducing provisions: 
 
- Exchange of info on maneuvers etc.: “reciprocal written information will be provided about 
movements of naval forces involving four or more ships (…)” (UK-Argentina 1990) 
 
- Regular consultation or hotlines: “mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison 
system” (Jordan-Israel 1994) 
 
- Surveillance or verification by the other party: “establish and operate early warning systems” 
(Israel-Egypt 1979) 
 
- Monitoring by third parties: “The United States of America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile will 
cooperate, by means of military observers, in arranging matters of withdrawal and the retirement 
of troops” (Ecuador and Peru 1942) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table 1: Independent Competing Risks Model: Cox Proportional Hazards Shared 
Frailty Model for the Effect of Changes and Agreement Provisions on the 
Occurrence of Conflict and Renegotiation  
 MILITARIZED DISPUTE RENEGOTIATION 
Changes in probability of 
winning 
.448*               56% increase 
(.25) 
.005 
(.44) 
Decreases in costs of fighting 1.309***       270% increase 
(.395) 
-.223 
(1.05) 
Cost-increasing provisions -.948***         61% decrease 
(.289) 
.089 
(.403) 
Uncertainty-reducing 
provisions 
-.131 
(.317) 
1.035**         181% increase 
(.404) 
Variance of the random effect 1.903*** 
(.677) 
0 
0 
N (# failures) 5249 (92) 5249 (26) 
Log-likelihood -426.776 -119.308 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***<.01. Efron method for ties. Gamma shared frailty. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Previous warfare and failure-proneness 
PREVIOUS WAR 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Less frail 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
FRAILTY  
 
More frail 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
16 
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Table 3: Independent Competing Risks Model: Shared Frailty Model for 
Militarized Conflict and Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Renegotiation using 
Interaction terms between Change and Agreement provisions 
 MILITARIZED DISPUTE RENEGOTIATION 
Change x cost-increasing 
provisions 
.13 
(.501) 
-.964 
(.816) 
Change x uncertainty-reducing 
provisions 
.085 
(.54) 
.279 
(.778) 
Change .487*               63% increase 
(.285) 
.091 
(.565) 
Cost-increasing provisions -.903**           59% decrease 
(.399) 
.523 
(.575) 
Uncertainty-reducing 
provisions 
-.228 
(.422) 
.861 
(.542) 
Variance of random effect 1.608*** 
(.565) 
 
N (# failures) 5518 (98) 5518 (27) 
Log-likelihood -464.367 -124.844 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***<.01. Efron method for ties. Gamma shared frailty for militarized dispute 
model. Robust standard error clustered on dyad for renegotiation model. 
  
